Ontology in Anselm, Descartes and Kant Essay

Ontology is a purported proof that God exists. The ontology provided by St. Anselm in the eleventh century set the standard in Western thought, and on which all subsequent ontology attempted to measure itself. Before the renaissance and the age of reason it was generally agreed that only a fool would deny the existence of God. Accordingly the ontology of St. Anselm employs the attitude of a fool – meaning some one without any of the higher concepts of philosophy – as the crux of the argument. The argument commences with a definition of God: â€Å"Now we believe that [the Lord] is something than which nothing greater can be thought† (81). The association made is to perfection, for only in perfection can we conceive nothing beyond. In traditional attempts at ontology the strategy was to find God amongst the splendor of his creation. Anselm, however, eschewed the evidence of experience and tried to affect a proof from pure thought. It is placed in the head of a simpleton, and in this way is made to appear as stemming from the innate mind, and not clouded by the errors of perceptual understanding. Anselm’s fool wants to cling to the idea that â€Å"God is not!† But such atheism does not strangle the thought processes inside the head. It necessarily searches for perfection, that being the natural inclination of man, which is to seek happiness, comfort, order, and so on. Can the fool imagine perfection, asks Anselm. The answer is that he cannot. For whatever ideal it fixes on, the mind surges past it for something even better. However, this relentless ascendancy within the mind presages the existence of perfection therein, for otherwise the mind chases after nothing. Now, since we have already identified perfection with God, the mind imagines God, and indeed strives towards it. Existence in the mind will not suffice as ontology. Therefore, as the next step in the argument, Anselm attempts to measure the idea with reality. We must next consider whether that which has been imagined as perfect has a corresponding reality beyond the mind. If it does not then we have a contradiction. For being in the mind alone we are then able to imagine something even greater than it. That which was imagined as perfect now turns out have something that is more perfect than it. Anselm is sure that he has found a contradiction here. So he proceeds to conclude:   â€Å"Therefore, there is no doubt that something than which a greater cannot be thought exists both in the understanding and in reality† (82). Descartes, though largely accepting this ontology, doesn’t accept the contradiction derived in the final step. He argues that reality has not been introduced at all, but only an idea if reality. In the final analysis the entire ontology is taking place in the head. It is an imagined God that Anselm proves, says, Descartes, not a real one. His correction, therefore, was to consider the phenomenal world after all. In this manner he laid out what has famously come to be known as â€Å"Cartesian doubt†. The world of sensory experience, when examined philosophically, naturally induces doubt, for all perspectives are subjective. It is impossible to construe an objective form subjective sensory experience. But instead of holding back doubt Descartes allows it full reign. He starts to explore what else can be doubted. Soon it is found that not only material reality, but also all the perceptions and ideas of the mind must also be doubted, for they all stem from the same faculty of understanding. But his doubting reach must come to and end eventually, when he comes to consider consciousness itself. Descartes discovers that he is unable to doubt the â€Å"I†, for it is the â€Å"I† itself that is doubting, i.e. thinking. Thus his famous conclusion, â€Å"Cogito, ergo sum† – I think, therefore I am (68). From the proof of self-existence to the proof of God is a simple step. A self that is subject to doubt is imperfect, and therefore implies the existence of Creator who is perfect. Kant, in turn, comes to dismiss both these attempts at ontology on the simple premise that existence is not a predicate. In other words, it is meaningless to say simply â€Å"God is.† Our concepts of understanding allow us to apply reason in the form of sentences that contain both subject and predicate. So that we can say that ‘God is good’, or that ‘God is merciful’. But simply ‘God is’ is not meaningful, and human understanding does not allow such speculation. In effect, Kant is saying that ontology is not possible. This is in concord with the rest of Kant’s philosophy, which emphasizes that we are not able to pronounce on the noumenal world, i.e. on â€Å"things in themselves†. He describes three categories of noumena – the soul, the material world, and God, the last being the source of the first two. Therefore God is definitely part of Kant’s philosophical scheme, only that he remains beyond human understanding, and we cannot even pronounce on God is the simplest form – ‘God is.† Just as we cannot know anything about the soul, or the material world, as things in themselves, but only come to know the consequences of them. Our understanding is limited to the phenomenal world, where practical reason applies. Kant also speculates on the existence of a transcendental â€Å"pure reason†, that which overcomes the anomalies of practical reason. Pure reason is identified as an end in itself, and is thus identified with perfection. He stipulates it as a moral imperative that we pursue â€Å"pure reason† as the highest goal. Yet he refuses to identify this perfection with God, and differs with Anselm on this point. He also differs with Descartes’ ‘cogito, ego sum’, and complains that logic is being applied to derive existence, the rationale being that the part cannot be used to explain the whole. The least objectionable ontology, in my opinion, is that of St. Anselm’s. To make this point I will show that the refutations put forward by Descartes and Kant are not appropriate. Descartes’ complaint was that the proof given by Anselm is wholly ideal, without reference to the phenomenal world to give it substance. But Anselm does indeed refer to the phenomenal world, when he introduces the postulate that the ideal of perfection has no corresponding existence in the real world. In fact on this postulate the entire argument hinges, for it is used to derive the contradiction, from whence the ontology ensues. â€Å"Cartesian doubt† a merely a long-winded way of coming to the same conclusion. Kant’s complaint, on the other hand, is not really an argument at all, but rather a boast that he has not has to use the words â€Å"God exists† anywhere in his philosophy. For to pick on the grammar of â€Å"God exists† on the justification that the noumenal world is unknowable is taking matters too strictly. Even accepting Kant’s theory, it is not right that we desist from pronouncing the existence of God. He may not have done so explicitly, but Kant does indeed pronounce of the existence of God in the implicit sense. As a moral precept to action he gives us the categorical imperative: â€Å"I am never to act otherwise than so that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law† (13). The universal law is pertaining to the moral law, which is described as an end itself, and therefore is no different from the idea of perfection. An imperative is only categorical when it works universally, without contingency. To paraphrase Kant, the rationale of human existence is to pursue the moral life in order to attain to perfection, in other words, God. Other than the fastidious insistence of grammar, Kant does not really object to Anselm’s ontology. With both Descartes’ and Kant’s objections discredited, Anselm’s ontology must stand as the best, being the simplest and most intuitive. Works Cited Anselm. Basic Writings. Translated by Thomas Williams. Boston: Hackett Publishing, 2007. Descartes, Rene. Meditations on First Philosophy: With Selections from the Objections and Replies. Translated by John Cottingham. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Kant, Immanuel. Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals. Whitefish, MT: Kessinger Publishing, 2004.